On the Changing Structure of International Investment Law: The Human Right to Water and ICSID Arbitration by MARRELLA F.
© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2010 DOI: 10.1163/187197310X513734




On the Changing Structure of International Investment Law:
The Human Right to Water and ICSID Arbitration
Fabrizio Marrella*
Professor of International Law, University Cà Foscari, Venice, Italy
Director, European Inter-University Center for Human Rights and Democratisation,
Venice, Italy
Abstract
Water is the world’s third largest industry after oil and energy power. Although clean drinking water and 
sanitation are necessary for the health and development of individuals and communities, even today, 
billions of people lack access to either. In response to these concerns, the international community has 
set a Millennium Development Goal (MDG) of providing, by 2015, clean water and improved sanita-
tion to at least half of the people worldwide who now lack these services. Water is treated both as a pub-
lic good and an economic good. In the last decade, we have witnessed the commoditisation through 
privatization and liberalisation of an essential good for each individual’s life. Transnational corporations 
may encounter water issues in at least three diﬀerent contexts: a) as enablers of access to water; b) as 
providers or distributors of water and c) as a user or consumer of water. Many initiatives have been 
developed within the United Nations such as the Global Compact and the appointment of both an 
independent expert on human rights obligations related to access to safe drinking water and sanitation 
and a Special Representative of the Secretary General on business and human rights. Both of them are 
mainstreaming human rights in the business sector reconciling diﬀerent forms of regulations. The right 
to water has come into discussion in a number of ICSID arbitrations and other cases are still pending. 
The purpose of this article is to discuss the advancement of the thinking in this ﬁeld so that it could be 
applied in arbitration practice.
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1. Introduction
Water is the world’s third largest industry after oil and energy power. Although 
clean drinking water and sanitation are necessary for the health and develop-
ment of individuals and communities, even today, billions of people lack access 
to either. In response to these concerns, the international community has set a 
Millennium Development Goal (MDG) of providing, by 2015, clean water and 
improved sanitation to at least half of the people worldwide who now lack these 
services.
Even before the present world ﬁnancial markets crisis, the water and sanitation 
infrastructure sector, were at the centre of many problems: freshwater scarcity 
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and growing demand; underinvestment in infrastructure in both developed and 
developing countries; corruption; and controversy over the appropriate roles of 
the public and private sectors in ownership of water resources and responsibility 
for service delivery.
The impact of economic globalisation on the right to water carries the high 
likelihood of being negative particularly for the most marginalised in societies. 
Too often human rights concerns have been kept apart from, or simply forgot-
ten in policy domains that shape business practices, including commercial pol-
icy, investment policy and corporate governance. This is especially true when 
major capital investments are needed to bring water to urban and rural popula-
tions and it is a primary duty to the State to do them, with or without the help 
of private parties.
Water is treated both as a public good and an economic good. In the last 
decade, we have witnessed the commoditisation through privatization and liber-
alisation of an essential good for each individual’s life. In this perspective, an 
assessment of the gradual convergence of International Economic Law with the 
human right to water has become unavoidable.
If water is essential for human survival (water contamination, inter alia, weak-
ens or destroys natural ecosystems that support human health, food production, 
and biodiversity), then it is logical to consider access to water as a human right. 
How should this right then be protected, respected and fulﬁlled by States? Pro-
ponents of market-based solutions believe that putting a price on water and 
allowing the private sector to deliver water services is the most eﬃcient way to 
maintain water resources and bring new capital to the sector. Advocates of water 
as a public good, on the other hand, emphasize the unique characteristics of 
water and the market failures (actual or potential) to deliver water to the poor, 
not to speak about the ecological and non-economic values of water. Therefore, 
in the latter case, water should be the object of a State monopoly under strict 
regulation and full transparency management.
Recent international practice has evidenced that some investment treaties and 
State contract provisions may unduly constrain the host Government’s ability to 
achieve its policy objectives, including its international human rights obliga-
tions.1 That is because under threat of taking the host State to binding interna-
tional arbitration, a foreign private investor may end up being able to obtain 
signiﬁcant advantages in terms of regulation, or seek compensation from the 
Government for the cost of compliance. At the same time, however, the right to 
regulate by the State must be consistent with the private investors’ need for pre-
dictability, rule of law, treatment, protection and guarantee about the actions of 
the host State, including compensation in the event of expropriation.
1) For a general discussion see W. Benedek, K. De Feyter and F. Marrella, Economic Globalisation and 
Human Rights (2007); D. Carreau and P. Jolliard, Droit international économique, Paris: Dalloz, 4th edi-
tion, 2010.
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Every State needs foreign private investments and, therefore, providing eﬀec-
tive investor protection is necessary for maintaining FDI. How can these com-
peting interests be balanced between investors and host States so that both of 
them will beneﬁt from it? How can non-investors, i.e., the common people, 
avoid paying the negative externalities of such an operation when a State fails to 
exercise its regulatory powers over water?
It is not the purpose of this article to provide the ﬁnal solution to such a com-
plex problem, nor is it possible to debate the merits of private versus public 
ownership of water service utilities. Rather, this article will ﬁrst discuss the right 
to water as a human right and its impact on corporations ‘activities. Then refer-
ence will be made to the impact of ICSID arbitration on the right to water and 
to the possibilities of balancing diﬀerent interests at stake.
2. The Right to Water as a Human Right
Notwithstanding the intuitive importance of water within the most vital human 
rights, it may be surprising to see that very few express references may be found 
in fundamental international instruments. For any reasonable human being, 
every individual should hold a right to access adequate and drinking water while, 
under international law, national Governments should ensure that water is avail-
able, without discrimination to the population present in their territory. Is the 
right to water the product of some academics, a matter of logics or a rule of pos-
itive law? The legal framework is particularly complex although the great major-
ity of commentators speak easily of the right to water as a human right.2 As a 
matter of facts, an express reference to it is quite rare in international human 
rights law instruments.
2) See: F. Marrella, “Regolazione internazionale e responsabilità globale delle imprese transnazionali”, 
3 Diritti Umani e Diritto Internazionale (2009) 229–258; F. Marrella, F. Galgano, Diritto e prassi del 
commercio internazionale (2010); Benedek et al., Economic Globalisation and Human Rights (2007); 
M. Fitzmaurice, “The Human Right to Water”, Fordham Environmental Law Review (2007)538–586; 
J. Razzaque, “Trading Water: the Human Factor”, Review of European Community and International 
Environmental Law (2004) 15–26; A. Tanzi, “Controversial Developments in the Field of Public Partici-
pation in the International Environmental Law Process”, in P.-M. Dupuy and L. Vierucci (eds.), NGOs 
in International Law: Eﬃciency in Flexibility? (2008), pp. 135–152; A. Tanzi and C. Pitea, Emerging 
Trends in the Role of Non-State Actors in International Water Disputes, in Resolution of international water 
disputes: papers emanating from the Sixth PCA International Law Seminar (8 November 2002), 2003, 
pp. 259–297; Stan Bernstein, “Freshwater and Human Population: A Global Perspective,” in Karin M. 
Krchnak (ed.), Human Population and Freshwater (2002), pp. 149–157, available at: http://environment.
yale.edu/documents/downloads/0–9/107Bernstein.pdf; T. Treves, M. Frigessi di Rattalma, A.Tanzi, 
A. Fodella, C. Pitea and C.Ragni (eds.), Civil Society, International Courts and Compliance Bodies (2005); 
T. Treves, L. Pineschi, A. Tanzi, C. Pitea, C. Ragni and F. Romanin Jacur (eds.), Non-Compliance Mecha-
nisms and Procedures and the Eﬀectiveness of International Environmental Agreements (2009).
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At the global level, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights3 and the 1966 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,4 are very 
timid on the point. The latter, foresees, it Art. 11, a right to “an adequate stan-
dard of living . . . including adequate food, clothing and housing, and to the con-
tinuous improvement of living conditions” to which it is added, at Art. 14(2)(c), 
a provision of “adequate nutrition and safe drinking water”.
A more concrete development, although contained in a soft law instrument 
may be found in General Comment n.15 of the UN Committee on Interna-
tional Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of 26 November 2002 
(E/C.12/2002/11) on the right to water. According to the General Comment, 
the right to water is derived from that of every individual to an adequate stan-
dard of living (Art. 11) and the right to health (Art. 12).
As a matter of facts, Art. 11, para 1, of the ICESCR speciﬁes a number of 
rights emanating from, and indispensable for, the realization of the right to an 
adequate standard of living “including adequate food, clothing and housing”. 
The use of the word “including” thus indicates that this catalogue of rights was 
not intended to be exhaustive. Moreover, the right to water is presupposed for 
securing an adequate standard of living since it is one of the most fundamental 
conditions for survival. In addition, the right to water is inextricably related to 
the right to the highest attainable standard of health (Art. 12, para. 1) and the 
rights to adequate housing and adequate food (Art. 11, para. 1). All in all, the 
right to water may be considered as a pillar where the right to life and human 
dignity are to be constructed.
Even in other international instruments such as the 1966 International Con-
vention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,5 the 1979 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women,6 
the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child7 and the 2006 Convention on 
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, express references, where they exist, are 
very timid.
It should not therefore be surprising to note that more food for thought is 
found into declarations and international programmes with regard to access to 
safe drinking water and sanitation adopted by major United Nations conferences 
and summits, and by the General Assembly at its special sessions and during fol-
low-up meetings, inter alia, the Mar del Plata Action Plan on Water Develop-
ment and Administration, adopted at the United Nations Water Conference in 
3) See Art. 25 of the UDHR where it is envisaged in broad terms “a standard of living adequate for the 
health and wellbeing . . . including food, clothing, housing”.
4) 993 UNTS 3.
5) 660 UNTS 195.
6) 1249 UNTS 13. See Art. 14(2)(h) where it it speaks of “adequate living conditions”, particularly in 
relation to housing, sanitation, electricity and water supply.
7) 1577 UNTS 3. See Art 24(2)(c) where the convention provides “to combat disease and malnutri-
tion . . . through the provision of adequate nutritious foods and clean drinking-water”.
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March 1977, Agenda 21, adopted at the United Nations Conference on Envi-
ronment and Development in June 1992, and the Habitat Agenda, adopted at 
the second United Nations Conference on Human Settlements in 1996.8
All in all the most important achievement at this level is the inclusion of this 
issue amongst the Millennium Development Goals, stressing, in that context, 
the resolve of Governments to halve, by 2015 the proportion of people unable 
to reach or aﬀord safe drinking water, and to halve the proportion of people 
without access to basic sanitation, as agreed in the Johannesburg Plan of Action.
The situation looks slightly diﬀerent on a regional scale. Reference here, may 
be made to the Protocol on Water and Health, adopted by the United Nations 
Economic Commission for Europe in 1999,9 the European Charter on Water 
Resources, adopted by the Council of Europe in 2001, the Abuja Declaration, 
adopted at the ﬁrst Africa-South America summit in 2006, the message from 
Beppu, adopted at the ﬁrst Asian-Paciﬁc Water Summit in 2007, the Delhi Dec-
laration, adopted at the third South Asian Conference on Sanitation in 2008, 
and the Cairo Declaration, adopted at the ﬁfteenth summit of Heads of State 
and Government of the Non-Aligned Movement in 2009.
Finally, one should note that in recent years speciﬁc constitutional norms have 
been introduced in at least ten countries, reinforcing via domestic law the impor-
tance of the right to water and, as such, evidencing that international rules on 
the right to water as a human right should be placed high in the Governments’ 
agenda.
Such constitutional solutions look quite diﬀerent.10 On one extreme of the 
scale, one may place the amendment to the Uruguay constitution of 2004 where 
private investment in water services is made unconstitutional per se, in order to 
protect the human right to water while Ecuador has made privatization of water 
services unconstitutional but providing at the same time a transition clause for 
the Bechtel subsidiary InterAgua to transfer operations back to the public sector. 
Bolivia and Colombia are elaborating provision on the human right to water, 
and India and Argentina have recognized this right through interpretations of 
other constitutional provisions – the right to life and the right to a healthy envi-
ronment, respectively. In South Africa, the national constitution provides for a 
right to water and the High Court has conﬁrmed the nature of human right of it.11 
 8) See the Resolution of the Human Rights Council adopted on 12 October 2009 on Human Rights 
and access to safe drinking water and sanitation, Doc. A/HRC/RES/12/8.
 9) See http://www.unece.org/env/water/text/text_protocol.htm (visited on 20 May 2010).
10) See The Center for Economic and Social Rights, The Right of Access to Water: Relevant Constitu-
tional Provisions. (Listing: Ethiopia, Gambia, Guatemala, Panama, Uganda, South Africa, Venezuela, 
and Zambia.). See in particular Uruguay Constitution (2004), Art. 47, 188. See also Ecuador’s Consti-
tution (2008), Arts. 13, 41 and transitoria 4.
11) See Lindiwe Mazibuk, and Others v. Johannesburg Water and Others, South African High Court, Wit-
watersrand Local Division, Case no: 06/13865 (July 7, 2007) and in particular P. Bond, J. Dugard, “The 
case of Johannesburg water: what really happened at the pre-paid ‘Paris pump’”, in Law, Democracy and 
Development, at http://www.ukzn.ac.za/ccs/ﬁles/Bond%20Dugard%20LDD.pdf (visited on 15 May 2010).
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India has reached a similar result only via case law, ruling that private corpora-
tions violating the human right to water can be held liable.12
Confronted with the (poor) legal landscape that has been sketched above, the 
UN Human Rights Council adopted a decision (in Nov 2006) and a resolution 
(in Sept 2007) regarding human rights and equitable access to safe drinking 
water and sanitation. In March 2008, the Human Rights Council by its resolu-
tion 7/22, decided to appoint an independent expert on the issue of human 
rights obligations related to access to safe drinking water and sanitation. Accord-
ingly at its September 2008 session, the Human Rights Council appointed Ms. 
Catarina de Albuquerque (Portugal) as an independent expert for a period of 
three years. She took up her function on 1 November 2008 and her work is cur-
rently ongoing.
Her work, together with that of the Special Representative of the Secretary 
General on business and human rights – to which reference will be made herein-
after – will contribute to get the International Community moving towards the 
accomplishment of, inter alia, Millennium Development Goal 7. This Goal is 
intended to halve, by 2015, the proportion of people who are unable to reach, 
or to aﬀord, safe drinking water; and to stop the unsustainable exploitation of 
water resources, by developing water management strategies at the regional, 
national and local levels, which promote both equitable access and adequate 
supplies.
Five normative criteria for the full realization of the right to water have been 
identiﬁed (availability, accessibility, quality/safety, aﬀordability, acceptability) with 
ﬁve cross cutting ones (non-discrimination, participation, accountability, impact, 
sustainability).
Availability refers to suﬃcient quantities, reliability and the continuity of sup-
ply. In other words, water should be available and in a suﬃcient quantity for 
meeting personal and domestic requirements of drinking and personal hygiene 
as well as for further personal and domestic uses such as cooking and food prep-
aration, dish and laundry washing and cleaning. There must also exist suﬃcient 
number of sanitation facilities (with associated services) within, or in the imme-
diate vicinity, of each household, health or educational institution, public insti-
tution and place, and the workplace.
Water, then, should be accessible. This means that sanitation and water facili-
ties are physically accessible, at day and night, for everyone within, or in the 
immediate vicinity, of each household, health or educational institution, public 
institution and the workplace. ideally within the home, including for people 
with special needs.
12) Indian Supreme Court in M C Mehta v. Union of India 2004 (12) SCC118, about Coca Cola opera-
tions in Kerala.
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Thirdly, access to sanitation and water facilities and services must be aﬀord-
able, i.e., accessible at a price all people can pay. Paying for services, including 
construction, cleaning, emptying and maintenance of facilities, as well as treat-
ment and disposal of faecal matter, must not limit people’s capacity to acquire 
other basic goods and services, including food, housing, health and education 
guaranteed by other human rights. This also means that the State is obliged to 
ensure the provision of services free of charge (e.g., through social tariﬀs or cross-
subsidies) for those who are genuinely unable to pay for sanitation and water 
through their own means.
Fourthly, sanitation facilities must be hygienically safe to use. They must also 
take into account the safety needs of peoples with disabilities, as well as those of 
children. Regular maintenance and cleaning are essential for ensuring the sus-
tainability of sanitation facilities and continued access. Water must be of such a 
quality that it does not pose a threat to human health. Transmission of water-
borne diseases via contaminated water must be avoided.
Finally, water and sanitation facilities and services must be culturally and 
socially acceptable. Acceptability means also privacy, as well as separate facilities 
for women and men in public places, and for girls and boys in schools. In regard 
to water, apart from safety, water should also be of an acceptable colour, odour 
and taste.
Five other parameters are to be considered cross-cutting ones. The ﬁrst one is 
non discrimination. As indicated by treaty law, discrimination on race, colour, 
sex, age, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, 
property, birth, physical or mental disability, health status or any other civil, 
political, social or other status must be avoided, both in law and in practice. 
Individuals and groups potentially vulnerable or marginalized include: women, 
children, inhabitants of (remote) rural and deprived urban areas as well as other 
people living in poverty, refugees and IDPs, minority groups, indigenous groups, 
nomadic and traveller communities, elderly people, persons living with disabili-
ties, persons living with HIV/AIDS or aﬀected by other health conditions, peo-
ple living in water scarce-regions and sanitation workers amongst others.
Secondly, processes related to planning, design, construction, maintenance 
and monitoring of sanitation and water services should be participatory. This 
requires, inter alia, including representatives of all concerned individuals, groups 
and communities in the decision making processes. To allow for participation in 
that sense, transparency and access to information is essential. Last but not least, 
accountability should be always guaranteed.
The realization of the human right to water requires responsive and account-
able institutions, with a clear designation of responsibilities and coordination 
between diﬀerent entities involved. In addition to participation and access to 
information mentioned above, communities should be able to participate in 
monitoring and evaluation as part of ensuring accountability.
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In cases of violations – be it by States or non-State actors –, States have to 
provide accessible and eﬀective judicial or other appropriate remedies at both 
national and international levels. Victims of violations should be entitled to ade-
quate reparation, including restitution, compensation, satisfaction and/or guar-
antees of non-repetition.
3. Transnational Corporations, the Right to Water and the Evolving 
International Agenda
Transnational corporations may encounter water issues in at least three diﬀerent 
contexts:
a) as enablers of access to water;
b) as providers or distributors of water and
c) as a user or consumer of water.
Leaving aside this latter aspect, one may note that Human Rights may be vio-
lated by a company if its facilities pollute the surroundings aﬀecting ipso facto 
the rights to a home, to health of persons and the environment.13 Also, as a pre-
liminary note, it should be observed that, in the framework of the European 
Convention on Human Rights, it is now settled that companies and their share-
holders beneﬁt from human rights protection against the host State in which 
they operate.14
Such aspects have grown in importance in the last decade, due to the fact that 
many States have conducted for various reasons (mostly under the push of the 
International Monetary Fund or the World Bank) large privatization policies. 
Have then they privatised the international obligations they had in terms of pro-
tecting, respecting and fulﬁlling human rights, including the right to water of 
the people? The answer is negative.
13) Art. 8 of the ECHR seems to covers such a situation (EctHR, Lopez Ostra v. Spain, 9 December 
1994). The Court sayed the State did not succeed in striking a fair balance betw. the interest of the town 
(having a waste-treatment plan) and the applicant’s enjoyment of her right to respect for her home and 
her private and family life. 
14) On shareholder rights under ECHR law in general see: Agrotexim Hellas SA and Others v. Greece A 
330 (1995); (1996) 21 EHRR 250; Association and H. v Austria (1984) 36 DR 187 at 191–2; Matos e 
Silva Lda and Others v. Portugual 1996-IV 1092; (1997) 24 EHRR 573; Société Colas Est et autres v. 
France 2002-III 421; Autronic AG v. Switzerland A 178 (1990); (1990) 12 EHRR 485; Demuth v Swit-
zerland 2002-IX 704; (2004) 38 EHRR 20; Comingersoll SA v. Portugal 2000-IV 355; (2001) 31 EHRR 
772. On shareholder rights under Protocol 1(1) in particular: Olczak v. Poland, Decision of November 
7, 2002, EHRR 2002-X ¶ 61; Company S-S I AB and BT v. Sweden, Application 11189/84 (1986) 50 
DR 121, 138; Bramelid and Malmström v. Sweden, Application 8588–89/79 (1982) 29 DR 64, 81; 
(1983) 5 EHRR 249. For an extensive analysis see Marius Emberland, The Human Rights of Companies: 
Exploring the Structure of ECHR Protection (2006), pp. 65 et seq. 
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Privatization consists in hiring private enterprises to carry out public service 
functions. Its aim is, theoretically, to bring market eﬃciency and new sources of 
capital to under-funded and poorly managed public enterprises. Sometimes, this 
operation may replace a state-owned monopoly with a private one. Thus, if not 
carefully considered, the economic cure may only displace the problem of realis-
ing the right to water for all, from the realm of politics and public decision-mak-
ing to the realm of markets and private proﬁt seeking.15
In the last decade, we have also witnessed the phenomenon of a shift towards 
private sector for UN projects ﬁnancing. The creation and the founding of 
the Global Compact has become a new paradigma in International Law and the 
main avenue of persuading transnational corporations to act responsibly. The 
human rights and business framework with the Global Compact as its zenith, 
has developed over a number of decades, beginning with the 1976 Organization 
for Economic Development and Cooperation (OECD) Guidelines for Multina-
tional Enterprises;16 the 1977 International Labour Organization (ILO) Tripar-
tite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social 
Policy;17 the United Nations Commission on Transnational Corporations’ code 
of conduct initiated in the 1970s and abandoned in 1994;18 and the contentious 
United Nations “Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations 
and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights”,19 which was 
abandoned in 2004.20
The United Nations Global Compact is the result of the call launched by the 
United Nations Secretary General Koﬁ Annan in 1999 at the World Economic 
Forum. Under this scheme, member corporations and organisations can sign up 
to the Global Compact and report on their compliance with its ten principles 
relating to labour, human rights, anti-corruption and the environment.21 It is 
designed to promote ‘responsible corporate citizenship’ and has over 5,200 cor-
porate members worldwide.
15) See for example J. Stiglitz, Making Globalization Work (2006).
16) Part of the OECD Declaration and Decisions on International Investment and Multinational Enter-
prises, updated June 2000.
17) Adopted November 1977, 204th Session, amended November 2000, 279th Session (2001), <http://
www.ilo.org/public/english/employment/multi/download/english.pdf>.
18) One may add in such a framework the 1977 Code of Conduct for Companies Operating in South 
Africa during apartheid which was adopted by the European Economic Communities, see U.N. Doc. 
A/32/267.
19) See U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council (ECOSOC), Sub-Comm. On Promotion and Protection of Human 
Rights, The United Nations Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other business 
Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (26 August 2003).
20) Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other business Enterprises with Regard to Human 
Rights, C.H.R. Res. 2004/116, U.N. ESCOR, Commission on Human Rights, 60th Session, U.N. 
Doc. E/CN.2/2004/L.73/Rev.1 (2004).
21) <http://www.unglobalcompact.org>.
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The UN envisage the Global Compact as a dialogue forum to promote mutual 
learning amongst corporations. The focus is essentially on helping corporations 
learn about ‘best practices’ and elaborating codes of conduct. This codes, how-
ever, in their general form, lack of strong law enforcement mechanisms. They are 
based more on peer-to-peer and market mechanisms: if member companies 
break the codes of conduct, the main sanction is a delisting from the Global 
Compact. By the same instrument, companies pledge to report regularly on how 
they are implementing the Compact’s codes. To demonstrate progress, members 
use the Global Compact’s “Communication on Progress”, which is designed to 
highlight companies’ information in CSR reports.
The ﬂipside of the coin is that by encouraging corporate ‘best practices’ 
mutual learning and voluntary respect for human rights, the UN and its Mem-
ber States avoid tackling the hot issue of concrete action at the international 
hard law level against corporate human rights violations. The result has been, 
nonetheless, in many cases positive but, here again, without a clear leadership 
and UN-driven regulatory framework, there is a risk to allow some companies to 
wrap themselves in the blue ﬂag of the United Nations without increasing eﬀec-
tively human rights protection, particularly in the case of water.22
The issue of water is addressed by the Global Compact through the CEO 
Water Mandate, a voluntary initiative that is designed to assist companies in the 
development, implementation and disclosure of water sustainability policies and 
practices.23 Like the Global Compact, the CEO Water Mandate is based on a set 
of core elements that members claim to adhere to through a series of non-bind-
ing pledges (Direct Operations; Supply Chain and Watershed Management; 
Collective Action; Public Policy; Community Engagement; and Transparency).24 
Members are all encouraged to learn from other ‘best practices’. Most of the 
Mandate’s endorsers are major corporations that are reliant on water as a primary 
input. Endorsers include Suez, Coca-Cola, PepsiCo, Nestlé, Groupe Danone, 
Unilever, Dow Chemical, Levi Strauss and Hindustan Construction Co.
In 2005, besides the Global Compact and following the failed adoption by 
States of the “Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and 
22) See the critical views expressed by R. Girard in http://www.polarisinstitute.org/ﬁles/UNreport.pdf 
(visited on 15 May 2010).
23) The mission statement is as follows: “The CEO Water Mandate seeks to make a positive impact with 
respect to the emerging global water crisis by mobilizing a critical mass of business leaders to advance 
water sustainability solutions – in partnership with the United Nations, civil society organizations, 
governments, and other stakeholders. As a special initiative of the UN Secretary-General, The CEO 
Water Mandate oﬀers a unique action platform to share best and emerging practices and to forge multi-
stakeholder partnerships to address the problems of access to water and sanitation. The CEO Water 
Mandate covers six areas: Direct Operations; Supply Chain and Watershed Management; Collective 
Action; Public Policy; Community Engagement; and Transparency. Endorsers of The CEO Water Man-
date recognize that through individual and collective action they can contribute to the vision of the UN 
Global Compact and the realization of the Millennium Development Goals”. See http://www.unglobal-
compact.org/issues/Environment/CEO_Water_Mandate/.
24) Id.
 F. Marrella / International Community Law Review 12 (2010) 335–359 345
Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights”, the UN Secretary-
General to appoint a Special Representative for Business and Human Rights,25 
Prof. John Ruggie (hereinafter SRSG) who had played a great role in the design 
of the Global Compact.
After extensive research, Prof. Ruggie in 2008 elaborated a framework based 
on three core principles: protect, respect and remedy.26
The ﬁrst principle is the state duty to protect against human rights abuses by 
third parties, including business, through appropriate policies, regulation, and 
adjudication. The second principle is the corporate responsibility to respect 
human rights. In addition to compliance with applicable laws, companies are 
subject to what is sometimes called a social license to operate – or prevailing 
social expectations. The third principle is the need for more eﬀective access to 
remedies for victims of human rights abuses involving companies. Even where 
institutions operate optimally, disputes over adverse human rights impacts of 
companies are likely to occur, and victims need redress. These (non binding) 
ﬁndings have been widely accepted both from Governments and from the busi-
ness side.
However, it should not be forgotten that it is the task of the state to protect 
people within its frontiers against human rights infringements by non-state play-
ers. Privatization of essential goods and services does not amount to privatizing 
international responsibility. Human rights covenants are international legal con-
ventions, agreements between countries making contracting states responsible 
for implementation of human rights. Countries which have mutually under-
taken to protect, respect, fulﬁl and enforce human rights described in interna-
tional human rights conventions have to implement these rules through national 
practice. In this regard, those states which are not in a position to implement 
and enforce human rights eﬀectively should be helped more by the International 
Community in order to build up the appropriate judicial and administrative 
structures.27
A particular regulatory challenge, therefore, remains for business activity of 
companies in so-called weak governance zones. Weak governance zones are 
characterised by violence, corruption, deﬁcient administrations and arbitrary 
political decisions, all factors which are condemned by the same international 
business community since they hinder business activity, complicate planning 
and make investments extremely risky.
25) Human Rights Resolution 2005/69, <http://www.business-humanrights.org>.
26) Protect, Respect and Remedy: A Framework for Business and Human Rights, Report of the Special Repre-
sentative of the Secretary-General, John Ruggie, U.N. GAOR, Human Rights Council, 8th Session, 
Agenda Item 3, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/8/5 (2008).
27) In his 2008 report, John Ruggie singled out the OECD guidelines for multinationals as the most 
widely applicable standard conﬁrmed by governments. In his view, these guidelines should be reviewed, 
because they are too unspeciﬁc on human rights and fall short of many voluntary business standards. 
However, it should be noted that OECD national contact points fulﬁll an important function amongst 
non-judicial remedies, as recognized by Prof. Ruggie in his latest reports.
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Those (few) multinational companies that have invested in a weak governance 
zone face a dilemma: they may help to improve the situation locally thanks to 
their investments, such as through measures against child labour, discrimination, 
inadequate pay, despite an unstable situation. Or, on the contrary, they may face 
the accusation that their business involvement can sometimes give indirect sup-
port to an illegitimate or a dictatorial regime with the result of contributing to 
the perpetuation of unacceptable conditions. In such a context, training of key 
company oﬃcers in Human Rights and the ability to implement codes of con-
duct becomes a strategic asset both for the company and for its external stake-
holders. All in all, infringement of human rights and the absence of rule of law 
are massively detrimental to business activities and hence also impede companies 
with multinational operations.
Also in this perspective, the duty to respect becomes crucial. It is the duty of 
companies to respect human rights and to put in place the necessary manage-
ment structures to this end. Companies have an important role to play in sup-
porting and spreading human rights. The Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights calls on every individual as well as all sections of society, i.e. also includ-
ing business players, to help realize human rights. At the same time, companies 
themselves have a responsibility to respect human rights, which exists indepen-
dently of states. Corporate Social Responsibility begins with legal compliance 
and goes beyond compliance with host State law, especially when the law is 
enforced poorly or not at all. For these reasons, and also for a company to be 
able to demonstrate that it respects rights beyond legal requirements, a human 
rights due diligence process is nowadays indispensable.
“Naming and shaming” is a response by external stakeholders to the failure of 
companies to respect human rights. “Knowing and showing” is the new para-
digma, meaning internalization of that respect by companies themselves through 
human rights due diligence analysis.28
According to the SRSG, the duty to respect entails the following:
Companies should consider three sets of factors. The ﬁrst is the country contexts in which their 
business activities take place, to highlight any speciﬁc human rights challenges they may pose. The 
second is what human rights impacts their own activities may have within that context – for exam-
ple, in their capacity as producers, service providers, employers, and neighbours. The third is 
whether they might contribute to abuse through the relationships connected to their activities, 
such as with business partners, suppliers, State agencies, and other non-State actors. How far or 
how deep this process must go will depend on circumstances.29
28) Respect for human rights is not only a responsibility of multinational companies but is also incum-
bent in equal measure on domestic companies.
29) Protect, Respect and Remedy: A Framework for Business and Human Rights, Report of the Special Repre-
sentative of the Secretary-General, John Ruggie, U.N. GAOR, Human Rights Council, 8th Session, 
Agenda Item 3, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/8/5 (2008), paras 57–58.
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Thus, companies need to undertake the following four steps: 1) adopt a human 
rights policy;30 2) consider the human rights implications of activities through 
conducting impact assessments;31 3) integrate the human rights policy into the 
company’s activities, and throughout the company;32 4) audit performance against 
policies and assessments on an ongoing basis and report on this performance.33
A critical aspect of Ruggie’s pillar of the corporate obligation to “respect” 
human rights is the human rights impact assessment (“HRIA”) which bears sim-
ilarities to the environmental impact assessment. The SRSG developed a report 
on HRIAs concerning methodological questions and making reference to vari-
ous current initiatives. The International Finance Corporation (“IFC”) has 
developed Guide to Human Rights Impact Assessment in collaboration with the 
Global Compact and the International Business Leaders Forum.34
Companies may ﬁnd it diﬃcult to meet the ﬁrst requirement which is collect-
ing accurate and relevant information on the target regions of their investments. 
In addition, companies also need support on speciﬁc detailed questions relating 
to, for instance, implementation of particular social standards in certain regions. 
Here, the UN and its specialized agencies, such as the ILO, may become the hub 
for training and even implementation assessments.
In his latest report, the SRSG proposes that respect of human rights by com-
panies should also be strengthened through reporting obligations.35 The demand 
for transparency and credibility in business behaviour vis-à-vis human rights 
should be addressed via binding reporting obligations on these matters.
Finally, the SRSG is currently working to develop appropriate remedies. It is 
recognized that the key is to develop and strengthen judicial and non-judicial 
complaint mechanisms in order to improve remedies for human rights infringe-
ments committed by companies. Here, amongst non-judicial remedies, the 
national contact points put in place in the framework of the OECD guidelines 
for multinationals can be useful complaint mechanisms. But once again, it 
should be noted that the duty to implement and enforce human rights is pri-
marily a duty of states which must strengthen judicial complaint mechanisms 
and facilitate access to them. This is important for civil society and business 
30) Id. Para. 58: “For the substantive content of the due diligence process, companies should look, at a 
minimum, to the international bill of human rights and the core conventions of the ILO, because the 
principles they embody comprise the benchmarks against which other social actors judge the human 
rights impacts of companies”.
31) Id. para. 61.
32) Id. para. 62.
33) Id. para. 63.
34) Human Rights Impact Assessments – Resolving Key Methodological Questions, Report of the Special Repre-
sentative of the Secretary-General, John Ruggie, U.N. GAOR, Human Rights Council, 4th Session, 
Agenda Item 2, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/4/74 (2007).
35) See Business and Human Rights: Further steps toward the operationalization of the “protect, respect and 
remedy” framework, Doc. A/HRC/14/27, issued on 9 April 2010.
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since slow, poor and unreliable legal systems lead to legal uncertainty, to the det-
riment of civil society and the economic activity.
In this framework, companies should put in place their own complaint mech-
anisms in order to prevent and remedy their own mistakes. Companies therefore 
should use various avenues to come into contact with employees, consumers, 
local communities and all other stakeholders in order to give them the opportu-
nity to present their complaints and respond to them.
4. The Impact of ICSID Arbitration on the Right to Water
During the 1990s a trend towards privatization of infrastructures emerged 
mostly in developing countries, some of these privatizations entailed services 
such as water and sewage, electricity supply or public transportation.36 Thus, for-
eign private investors found themselves involved in activities with a clear impact 
on human rights obligations incumbent upon States. Conversely, States over-
looked the fact that by privatizing certain essential services there would have been 
no transfer of international responsibility in terms of human rights obligations.
Here, basically, some States have faced a dilemma: in order to attract more 
foreign private investment, they have allowed companies to charge higher bills 
to citizens for water with the result of breaching human rights obligations. As 
soon as it was not tenable anymore, Governments have issued administrative 
measures (such as price-freezing) against foreign private parties with the result of 
breaching international investment obligations and therefore lead to ICSID 
arbitration. It is not excessive to say that International Investment Law has 
encountered International Human Rights Law in such a context with trial and 
error policies from Governments and from water companies.
So far investment arbitrators37 have either escaped from developing a compre-
hensive balanced approach to such issues or, simply, as has been observed, they 
36) U. Kriebaum, “Privatizing Human Rights”, Transnational Dispute Management (2007) 3–5. See also 
S. Pannatier and O. Ducrey, “Water Concessions and Protection of Foreign Investments under Interna-
tional Law”, in E. Brown Weiss, L. Boisson de Chazournes and N. Bernasconi-Osterwalder (eds.), Fresh 
Water and International Economic Law, (2005); as well as P. Thielborger, “The Human Right to Water 
versus Investors Rights: Double Dilemma or Pseudo-conﬂict?”, in P.M. Dupuy, F. Francioni and 
E. Petersmann (eds.), Human Rights in International Investment Law and Arbitration (2009), pp. 487 
et seq.
37) See: Compañía de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. and Vivendi Universal v. Argentine Republic (ICSID Case 
no. ARB/97/3); Aguas Provinciales de Santa Fe, S.A., Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona, S.A. 
and Interagua Servicios Integrales de Agua, S.A. v. Argentine Republic (Case no. ARB/03/17); Aguas Cordo-
besas, S.A., Suez, and Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona, S.A. v. Argentine Republic (Case no. 
ARB/03/18); Aguas Argentinas, S.A., Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona, S.A. and Vivendi Uni-
versal, S.A. v. Argentine Republic (Case no. ARB/03/19); Azurix Corp. v. Argentine Republic (ICSID Case 
no. ARB/01/12); Aguas del Tunari S.A. v. Republic of Bolivia (ICSID Case no. ARB/02/3); Azurix Corp. 
v. Argentine Republic (ICSID Case no. ARB/03/30); SAUR International v. Argentine Republic (ICSID 
Case no. ARB/04/4); Anglian Water Group v. Argentine Republic, UNCITRAL arbitration ﬁled in 2003; 
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have addressed such questions in a “sporadic manner”.38 Yet, investment arbitra-
tions may raise, much more than international commercial arbitrations, funda-
mental issues of public interest. Despite what normally happens in international 
commercial arbitration, the resolution of large investment disputes cannot escape 
from deciding issues of public interest given the wider political and economic 
impact of the decision.
The right to water has come into discussion in a number of ICSID arbitra-
tions and gives a good picture about the diﬀerent interests at stake as well as the 
technical solutions which are progressively being developed by experts.
4.1. The Argentinean Saga
The case of Aguas de Aconquija v. Argentina,39 arose from the privatization of 
water and water services in the 1990s as a result of economic crisis in Argentina. 
Water and sewage facilities in the province of Tucumàn were operated by a pro-
vincial authority which, on 18 May 1995, awarded a Concession Contract to a 
French company, Compagnie Générale des Eaux together with its Argentine 
aﬃliate, Compañía de Aguas del Aconquija, S.A. (the Claimants or CGE). The 
Republic of Argentina was not, as such, a party to the Concession Contract or 
to the negotiations that led to its conclusion.
However, the Argentine Republic was a party to a bilateral investment treaty 
of July 1991 with France for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Invest-
ments (hereinafter, the Argentine-French BIT or BIT). Both the Argentine 
Republic and France were (and are) also parties to the Convention on the Settle-
ment of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States 
(ICSID Convention), which entered into force for both states prior to signature 
of the Concession Contract by CGE and Tucumán.
Articles 3 and 5 of the BIT provide that each of the Contracting Parties shall 
grant “fair and equitable treatment according to the principles of international 
law to investments made by investors of the other Party,” that investments shall 
enjoy “protection and full security in accordance with the principle of fair and 
equitable treatment,” and that Contracting Parties shall not adopt expropriatory 
or nationalizing measures except for a public purpose, without discrimination 
and upon payment of “prompt and adequate compensation.”
Biwater Gauﬀ (Tanzania) Ltd. v. United Republic of Tanzania (ICSID Case no. ARB/05/22); Impregilo 
S.p.A. v. Argentine Republic (ICSID Case no. ARB/07/17); Urbaser S.A. and Consorcio de Aguas Bilbao 
Biskaia, Bilbao Biskaia Ur Partzuergoa v. Argentine Republic (ICSID Case no. ARB/07/26).
38) M. Hirsch, “Investment and non investment obligations”, in P. Muchlinskly, F. Ortino and C. Schreuer 
(eds.), Oxford Handbook of International Investment Law (2008), p. 163.
39) Compañía de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. and Vivendi Universal S.A. v. Argentine Republic (ICSID Case 
No. ARB/97/3). Award of November 21, 2000, decided by Judge Francisco Rezek (President); Judge 
Thomas Buergenthal and Peter Trooboﬀ: 16 ICSID Rev. – FILJ 641 (2001); 40 ILM 426 (2001); 125 
I.L.R. 1 (2004); 26 Y.B. Com. Arb. 61 (2001) (excerpts).
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Article 8 of the BIT provides that, if an investment dispute arises between one 
Contracting Party and an investor from another Contracting Party and that dis-
pute cannot be resolved within six months through amicable consultations, then 
the investor may submit the dispute either to the national jurisdiction of the 
Contracting Party involved in the dispute or, at the investor’s option, to arbitra-
tion under the ICSID Convention or to an ad hoc tribunal pursuant to the 
Arbitration Rules of the United Nations Commission on International Trade 
Law. However, Art. 16.4 of the Concession Contract between CGE and 
Tucumán provided for the resolution of all contract disputes to be submitted to 
the exclusive jurisdiction of the contentious administrative courts of Tucumán.
On 26 December 1996, the private investors ﬁled a request for ICSID arbi-
tration against the Argentine Republic. The value of the claim was 300 million 
USD. The ICSID arbitrators nonetheless observed that:
It is undisputed that there were serious technical and commercial deﬁciencies in the structure and 
operation of the Tucumán water and sewer system at the time of the CGE takeover. The principal 
problems included severe operational diﬃculties resulting from the inadequate and antiquated 
infrastructure, deferred maintenance, tariﬀs that inadequately reﬂected the cost of operations and 
the required provision for capital expenditures, and failures in collection from Tucumán users, both 
private and commercial, of a signiﬁcant part of the tariﬀs actually imposed40
According to the Claimants, there were four categories of violations:
(1) “Acts that resulted in a fall in the recovery rate;”
(2) “Acts that unilaterally reduced the tariﬀ rate;”
(3) “Abuses of regulatory authority;”
(4) “Dealings in bad faith.”41
In the arbitration, the Claimants asserted that all of these acts were attributable 
to the Argentine Republic under international law and, as such, violated Argen-
tina’s obligations under the Agreement between the Government of the Argen-
tine Republic and the Government of the Republic of France for Reciprocal 
Protection and Promotion of Investments of 3 July 1991. Argentina responded 
that it had not participated in the agreement challenging the jurisdiction of the 
arbitration tribunal and stating that such a contract made no reference to the 
BIT or the ICSID Convention.
On 21 November 2000, the arbitrators rendered their award rejecting the 
objection to jurisdiction. The tribunal held that that these claims arose, in fact, 
from actions of the Province relating to the merits of disputes under the Conces-
sion Contract and, for that reason, were subject to initial resolution in the con-
40) ICSID Case No ARB/97/3, Award, para. 28.
41) Id., para. 63.
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tentious administrative tribunals of Tucumán. The tribunal added that the 
claimants should have demonstrated that the actions of Tucumàn oﬃcials 
amounted to a breach of the BIT and not (only) of the concession per se. There-
fore, in conclusion, the ICSID arbitrators dismissed the claims for 300 Million 
USD of damages.
Unhappy of such a result, CGE requested annulment of the award which was 
granted by ICSID.42 In its application, the Claimants alleged, ex art. Article 
52(3) of the ICSID Convention that: (a) the Tribunal had manifestly exceeded 
its powers; (b) the award had failed to state the reasons on which it was based; 
and (c) there had been a serious departure from a fundamental rule of procedure.
The Committee found that there was no basis for ﬁnding any departure from 
a fundamental rule of procedure. However, the Committee held that the Arbi-
tral Tribunal had manifestly exceeded its powers by upholding its jurisdiction to 
hear the Claimants’ claims brought under the BIT, but not deciding on a signiﬁ-
cant portion of those claims. Finally the Committee found that there was no 
need to consider the allegation of a failure to state reasons for the claims aﬀected 
by an excess of powers. On these bases, on 3 July 2002, the Committee issued a 
decision partially annulling the Arbitral Tribunal’s award of 21 November 2000.
On August 16, 2002, the Argentine Republic submitted to the Centre a 
request for a supplementary decision and rectiﬁcation of the Committee’s annul-
ment decision on the basis of Article 49(2) of the ICSID Convention.43 After 
considering the request and the parties’ further submissions, the Committee 
denied the Argentine Republic’s request for a supplementary decision and 
granted two of the rectiﬁcation requests made by the Argentine Republic.
All in all, it has emerged that a State may breach a treaty without breaching a 
contract and vice versa distinguishing the breach of international law which rests 
with ICSID arbitrators from the breach of the contract which, in this case, 
should have been discussed before domestic courts.
Another ICSID arbitration against Argentina, still pending according to the 
ICSID website, sheds more light on the issue of human rights in an interna-
tional investment arbitration context. In the case Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas 
de Barcelona S.A. and Vivendi Universal S.A. v. Argentine Republic,44 claimants 
42) ICSID Case No ARB/97/3, Decision on annulment. This time, arbitrators were Prof. James Craw-
ford, Prof. J. Carlos Fernandez Rosas and Yves Fortier (President).
43) According to the Argentine Republic, the Committee had failed to decide upon an omission made 
by the Arbitral Tribunal regarding one of the arguments made by the Argentine Republic during the 
main arbitral proceeding. The Argentine Republic also argued that there were material errors in the 
decision.
44) Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A. and Vivendi Universal S.A v. Argentine Republic 
(ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19).This case was originally registered by ICSID as Aguas Argentinas S.A., 
Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A. and Vivendi Universal S.A. v. the Argentine Republic 
(ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19). On April 14, 2006, the Arbitral Tribunal issued Procedural Order 
No.1 Concerning the Discontinuance of Proceedings with Respect to Aguas Argentinas S.A. (available 
online at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/ARB-03-19-PO-NO1.pdf ). The proceedings have since 
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(French and Spanish shareholders) invoked, in 2003, the investor-State dispute 
settlement provisions in the 1993 Argentina-France and the 1991 Argentina-
Spain bilateral investment treaties (BITs). Here the main argument is that the 
emergency measures adopted by the Argentine authorities in late 2001 and early 
2002 to ﬁght the economic crisis, constituted a breach of the BITs and of the 
water and sewer concessions received in the Province of Buenos Aires.
The Tribunal, presided over by Professor Jeswald W. Salacuse (U.S.), Professor 
Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler (Switzerland) and Professor Pedro Nikken (Venezu-
ela) after having invited the disputing parties to ﬁle their observations on the 
matter, received in January 2005, a request for leave to submit amicus curiae 
briefs by ﬁve non-governmental organizations, based in Buenos Aires and Wash-
ington, D.C. The main argument of the NGOs is that the case involved matters 
of public interest and fundamental rights of the people living in the area aﬀected 
by the underlying dispute. Accordingly they requested access to the case record 
and hearings. In the absence of the parties’ agreed consent in this case, under 
applicable ICSID Arbitration Rule 32(2) the Tribunal would have no choice but 
to deny the request.
The arbitrators, nonetheless, recognized that the admission of amicus curiae 
briefs is a “procedural question” that can be addressed under Art. 44 of the Arbi-
tration rules. This means that the Tribunal has found legal ground to admit 
amicus curiae briefs, notwithstanding the classical principle according to which 
non-disputing parties should not be admitted in an arbitration proceeding. It 
also identiﬁed the basic criteria, now codiﬁed under Art. 37, para. 2 of the 
ICSID Arbitration Rules, under which the amicus may be admitted.45
In this case, the Tribunal concluded that admission of amicus curiae briefs 
would depend on three basic criteria:
(a) the appropriateness of the subject matter of the case;
(b) the suitability of a given non-party to act as amicus curiae in that case, and
(c) the procedure by which the amicus submission is made and considered.46
continued with respect to claimants Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A. and Vivendi 
Universal S.A. The case has therefore been renamed to reﬂect this change.
45) Art. 37, par.2, provides that: “After consulting both parties, the Tribunal may allow a person or entity 
that is not a party to the dispute (in this Rule called the “non-disputing party”) to ﬁle a written submis-
sion with the Tribunal regarding a matter within the scope of the dispute. In determining whether to 
allow such a ﬁling, the Tribunal shall consider, among other things, the extent to which: – (a) the non-
disputing party submission would assist the Tribunal in the determination of a factual or legal issue rela-
ted to the proceeding by bringing a perspective, particular knowledge or insight that is diﬀerent from 
that of the disputing parties; -(b) the non-disputing party submission would address a matter within the 
scope of the dispute; -(c) the non-disputing party has a signiﬁcant interest in the proceeding.
The Tribunal shall ensure that the non-disputing party submission does not disrupt the proceeding or 
unduly burden or unfairly prejudice either party, and that both parties are given an opportunity to pre-
sent their observations on the non-disputing party submission”.
46) Order in Response to a Petition for Transparency and Participation as Amicus Curiae of May 19, 
2005, 21 ICSID Rev. – FILJ 342 (2006).
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With respect to the ﬁrst criterion, the Tribunal recognised that the dispute cen-
tred around water services provided to millions of people and thus may raise a 
variety of complex public and international law questions, including human 
rights considerations. Accordingly, any decision by the Tribunal would poten-
tially aﬀect the manner in which water concessions operate and thus the vast 
public they serve.
As to the Petitioners, the Tribunal identiﬁed as factors to be considered the 
expertise, experience, and independence of the amicus curiae given the fact that 
procedural rights of the disputing parties may be aﬀected by such submissions.
The case is still pending but some information about it has been published. It 
is reported that Argentina has argued that its BIT obligations must not be inter-
preted in a vacuum outside the rest of international law, but that BIT obliga-
tions should be read in light of other rules of international law linking Argentina, 
the United Kingdom, France and Spain, including “any treaty on human rights 
contemplating the human right to water”.47
Furthermore, Argentina contends that its treatment of the claimants was 
motivated by various business failings on the part of Aguas Argentinas under the 
light of the overriding obligation to protect the population’s right to water. Thus, 
the Argentine authorities had to intercede so as to ensure that the right to water 
was not undermined by third parties. In particular, Argentina quotes General 
Comment No. 15 on the “Right to Water”, in support of its “overriding respon-
sibility to ensure the availability of water to all members of society” and that its 
actions were a legitimate and proportionate response – rather than an act of 
indirect expropriation.48 It is also reported that the claimant water companies 
adduces that the human right to water is “irrelevant” to the arbitration and that 
the fair and equitable treatment clause of the BIT is conceived to provide a stable 
and predictable investment environment which ensures that an investor’s legiti-
mate and reasonable expectations are met.
A further argument is that of the state of necessity. Under this argument, a 
severe economic crisis could exempt a State from observing its international 
obligations under necessity. Therefore, any breach of the bilateral investment 
treaty should be excused and such a necessity should be recognized from the fact 
47) See L. Petersen, <http://www.dd-rd.ca/site/_PDF/publications/globalization/HIRA-volume3-ENG.
pdf>, (visited on 20 May 2010). Note that reference to human rights is also found in another arbitra-
tion concerning water and sewer services concession agreement, Azurix v. Argentina (ICSID Case No. 
ARB/01/12, ﬁnal award of 14 July 2006) although the arbitration tribunal (Andrés RIGO SUREDA, 
president; with Marc LALONDE from Canada and Daniel H. MARTINS from Uruguay) has conclu-
ded that (para. 261): “The Respondent has also raised the issue of the compatibility of the BIT with 
human rights treaties. The matter has not been fully argued and the Tribunal fails to understand the 
incompatibility in the speciﬁcs of the instant case. The services to consumers continued to be provided 
without interruption by ABA during ﬁve months after the termination notice and through the new pro-
vincial utility after the transfer of service”.
48) Id.
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that Argentina was hit by a ﬁnancial crisis. This argument has already been 
rejected in another ICSID arbitration, CMS Gas Transmission Company v. Argen-
tina on the grounds that Argentina had contributed to the crisis and disposed of 
other ways to react to it.49 A solution which has been followed by other ICSID 
arbitrators in Enron v. Argentina50 and, on a diﬀerent level and ground, even by 
the German Constitutional Court in a very recent case.51
4.2. Aguas del Tunari v. Bolivia: The “Water Civil War” of Cochabamba
The second landmark ICSID case where the “water problem” violently emerged 
was Aguas del Tunari v. Bolivia.52
Following classical World Bank economic recipes, Bolivia started a privatiza-
tion programme in 1997. The main purpose was to improve the water distribu-
tion system which was run ineﬃciently by the municipal company SEMAPA 
with the result of delivering water only to 57% of the population of Cocha-
bamba, the third largest city in Bolivia. As a result, a 40 year water supply con-
tract was entered in 1999 between a consortium of private companies and 
Bolivian Water and Electricity Superintendencies. The operation of the new pri-
vate supplier started in January 2000 and soon there were violent riots to protest 
against the sudden increase of water prices of 35% . The protests in Cochabamba 
49) CMS Gas Transmission Company v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Award of 
May 12, 2005, paras. 304–394, available at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/CMS_Award.pdf. 
See generally A. Reinisch, “Necessity in International Investment Arbitration – An Unnecessary Split 
of Opiniones in Recent ICSID Cases?”, 8 The Journal of World Investment & Trade (2007), pp. 191–214; 
A.K. Bjorklund, “Emergency Exceptions: State of Necessity and Force Majeure” in P. Muchlinski, 
F. Ortino and C. Schreuer (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of International Investment Law (2008), 
pp. 460–523.
50) Enron Corporation and Ponderosa Assets, L.P. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, Award 
of May 22, 2007 paras. 288 345, available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Enron-Award.pdf. See 
however LG&E Energy Corporation v. Argentina, by contrast, exempted Argentina from State responsibi-
lity on similar facts and arguments for a limited period of time (LG&E Energy Corp., LG&E Capital 
Corp., LG&E International Inc. v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1, Decision On Lia-
bility of Oct. 3, 2006, paras. 201–266, available at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/pdf/09_LGE_
Liability_e.pdf ). 
51) Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG], Decision of May 8, 2007, available at http://www.bverfg.de/
entscheidungen/ms20070508_2bvm000103.html.
52) Aguas del Tunari v. Bolivia, ICSID case No ARB/02/3, Decision on Jurisdiction, 21 October 2005. 
The Decision on Jurisdiction was rendered on October 3, 2005, by a Tribunal comprised of Mr. Henri 
C. Alvarez, a Canadian national, appointed by the Claimant, Dr. José Luis Alberro-Semerena, a national 
of Mexico, appointed by the Respondent, and Professor David D. Caron, a U.S.national, appointed by 
the Centre pursuant to Article 38 of the ICSID Convention and Rule 4 of the ICSID Arbitration Rules. 
On this case see M. Mc Farland Sanchez-Moreno, T. Higgins, “No recourse: Transnational Corporations 
and the Protection of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Bolivia, 27 Fordham International Law 
Journal (2004) 1663; R. Glennon, Water Scarcity, Marketing and Privatization”, Texas Law Review 
(2005) 1873, at 1894.
 F. Marrella / International Community Law Review 12 (2010) 335–359 355
were addressed by the Government through the military force, declaring martial 
law and with the tragic result of one teenager killed and about 100 people 
wounded.
In view of that, the private investor decided to discontinue the project and 
the Bolivian Government terminated the contract. The Government initially 
tried to reach an amicable settlement with the private investor but, after these 
negotiations failed, Aguas del Tunari ﬁled a formal request for arbitration to 
ICSID.
Accordingly, the proceedings were commenced by Aguas del Tunari S.A. claim-
ing that Bolivia, through various acts and omissions leading up to the termina-
tion of the Concession contract in April 2000, breached various provisions of 
the Agreement on Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments 
Between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Republic of Bolivia (the 
Netherlands-Bolivia BIT). Bolivia raised objections to jurisdiction of ICSID 
arbitrators on two main grounds. First, it stated that it did not consent to juris-
diction; and, second, on the ground that the Claimant was not a “national” of 
The Netherlands as deﬁned in the BIT insofar as it was not “controlled directly 
or indirectly” by nationals of The Netherlands. In its Decision on Respondent’s 
Objections to Jurisdiction, the Tribunal, by majority, concluded that the dispute 
was within the jurisdiction of the Centre and the competence of the Tribunal.
Secondly, Bolivia argued, inter alia, that the arbitration clause in the Conces-
sion Contract precluded ICSID jurisdiction; that all actions on which the 
Claimant based its claims, including the termination of the Concession, were 
taken by the Water Superintendency of Bolivia; that the BIT’s Article 2 recog-
nizes the application of Bolivian Law over the dispute. Even these arguments 
were ultimately rejected.
Shortly after the constitution of the Tribunal, certain individuals and environ-
mental non-governmental organizations ﬁled a joint petition requesting the Tri-
bunal to grant them standing to participate as parties in the proceeding or at 
least that they be granted the right to participate in proceedings as amici curiae. 
The Tribunal concluded that the interplay of the ICSID Convention and the 
BIT, and the consensual nature of arbitration placed the control of such issues 
into the parties’ hands. Since the agreement of both parties was absent in this 
case, the Tribunal lacked the power to join a non-party to the proceedings and, a 
fortiori, to the public generally or even to make the documents of the proceed-
ings public. In 2006, both parties settled their dispute. They declared that the 
concession was terminated because of the state of emergency in Cochabamba. 
Accordingly the ICSID proceeding were discontinued at the request of the 
Respondent.53
53) Order taking note of the discontinuance pursuant to ICSID Arbitration Rule 44 issued by the Tri-
bunal on March 28, 2006 (see http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/Index.jsp, visited on 15 May 2010).
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4.3. Biwater v. Tanzania
As a ﬁnal example, the case of Biwater v. Tanzania54 is illustrative of the new 
role of amici curiae, their input to the assessment of facts and law and about how 
ICSID arbitrators may deal with issues involving human rights considerations.
In 2003, the Republic of Tanzania obtained funds amounting to 140 million 
USD from the World Bank, the African Development Bank and the European 
Investment Bank for a program of repairing, updating, and expanding Dar es 
Salaam’s water and sewerage infrastructure. At the time, the water situation was 
precarious, i.e., water was not available in all regions, and the tariﬀs charged 
users of water were too low to fund capital expenditures. The sewerage situation 
was particularly bad. The funding was conditioned on having a private operator 
manage and operate the water and sewerage system. Accordingly, Biwater Gauﬀ 
(a joint venture of two European companies, one registered in England and 
Wales and one registered in Germany) submitted a tender and it was awarded 
the bid. According to the terms of such a tender, Biwater Gauﬀ would establish 
a local operating company, with a minimum number of shares to be held by a 
Tanzanian company or national. The operating company, City Water Services 
Limited, then entered into three contracts with the Dar es Salaam Water and 
Sewerage Authority (DAWAS).
One contract, the Water and Sewerage Lease Contract, required City Water 
to provide water and sewerage services for a ten-year period in a designated area 
and implement certain infrastructural works associated with the modernization 
project. By the same contract, City Water was to pay rental fees to DAWASA. 
City Water would collect an operator tariﬀ, which would fund its operations; a 
lessor tariﬀ, which it would turn over to DAWASA; and a ﬁrst-time connection 
tariﬀ, which would be placed in a trust account to fund low-income users’ con-
nection charges. In return, DAWASA gave City Water exclusive use of certain 
assets that City Water would lease from DAWASA, gave City Water the exclusive 
right to operate the designated water services, and promised not to operate in 
any way that would hinder or conﬂict with City Water’s operations.
City Water commenced performance on 1 August 2003 but the infrastructure 
problems made it particularly diﬃcult to bill and collect from customers for the 
services it provided, both because it faced unauthorized competitors and because 
many residents resisted the rise in the rates. A signiﬁcant issue was its failure to 
implement the new billing process, which would help fund City Water’s opera-
tions. Actually, City Water had underestimated the risks of the project and failed 
to allocate suﬃcient managerial and ﬁnancial resources to it. In the end, City 
54) Biwater Gauﬀ (Tanzania) Limited v. United Republic of Tanzania (ICSID Case No. ARB/05/22), 
award of 24 July 2008. The arbitrators were Gary Born (USA), Toby Landau (U.K) and Bernard Hano-
tiau (president, Belgian). See http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&
actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC770_En&caseId=C67 .
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Water requested an increase in the Operator Tariﬀ, but Tanzania rejected the 
request and relations between the government and Biwater Gauﬀ continued to 
deteriorate.
Between 13 May 2005 and 1 June 2005, DAWASA and other government 
authorities terminated the lease contract, occupied City Water’s facilities, took 
over the management and deported City Water’s senior managers.
Biwater Gauﬀ then brought a claim under the bilateral investment treaty 
(BIT) between the United Kingdom and the Republic of Tanzania, alleging 
expropriation of its property and unreasonable or discriminatory treatment. The 
company also claimed that Tanzania had violated its obligation to provide fair 
and equitable treatment and full protection and security, including a failure in 
permitting the repatriation of investment funds.
ICSID arbitrators granted a group of interested parties (Tanzanian and inter-
national NGOs) permission to ﬁle an amicus curiae brief in support of the Tan-
zanian Government.  This amicus brief was ﬁled in March 2007 and was taken 
into account by the Arbitration Tribunal.
In particular, the arbitrators (para. 359) have observed that:
The ﬁve Petitioners comprise NGOs with specialised interests and expertise in human rights, envi-
ronmental and good governance issues locally in Tanzania. They approach the issues in this case 
with interests, expertise and perspectives that have been demonstrated to materially diﬀer from 
those of the two contending parties, and as such have provided a useful contribution to these 
proceedings.
The arbitrators then (para. 366) deﬁne the role of the amici curiae with these 
words:
In addressing this issue, the Arbitral Tribunal noted that it was important to be clear as to the 
proper role of a “non disputing party”, or amicus curiae in any given case. In this case, given the 
particular qualiﬁcations of the Petitioners, and the basis for their intervention as articulated in 
the Petition, it was envisaged that the Petitioners would address broad policy issues concerning sus-
tainable development, environment, human rights and governmental policy. These, indeed, are the 
areas that fell within the ambit of Rule 37(2)(a) of the ICSID Arbitration Rules. Given the genera-
lised nature of the Petitioners’ interests and participation, what was not expected was that the Peti-
tioners (a) would consider themselves as simply in the same position as either party’s lawyers, or (b) 
that they would see their role as suggesting to the Arbitral Tribunal how issues of fact or law as pre-
sented by the parties ought to be determined (which is obviously the sole mandate of the Arbitral 
Tribunal itself ).
The amici argue that BGT’s acts and omissions caused its investment to fail and 
that investors in the water sector have a heightened level of responsibility because 
the success of a business venture in this area has a direct impact on the achieve-
ment of the right to clean and safe water.  The brief further argues that taking 
into consideration human rights and sustainable development, the termination 
of the contract by a government, if done in good faith to prevent the worsening 
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or abuse of human rights, should not be found to be a contractual breach, espe-
cially when a contract’s purpose was to promote and enhance the achievement of 
such rights.
This point is illustrated in the award at para. 380 where it is stated that:
The Amici submit that human rights and sustainable development issues are factors that condition 
the nature and extent of the investor’s responsibilities, and the balance of rights and obligations as 
between the investor and the host State. They conclude that foreign corporations engaged in proj-
ects intimately related to human rights and the capacity to achieve sustainable development (such 
as the project here), have the highest level of responsibility to meet their duties and obligations as 
foreign investors, before seeking the protection of international law. This is precisely because such 
investments necessarily carry with them very serious risks to the population at large
Moreover, the considerations above lead to this practical conclusion (para. 381):
Having analysed the scope and nature of investor responsibility in general, the Amici contend that, 
in this case, BGT failed to meet its speciﬁc responsibilities, and that it is BGT’s own acts and omis-
sions, rather than those of the Republic, which caused the investment to fail. In particular, it is said 
that BGT did not apply proper business standards and necessary care either in the pre-investment 
or the investment phases. On the Amici’s analysis, BGT submitted a bid that was too low for it to 
be able to meet the costs of providing the water services it promised to provide. Its business plan 
was based on unsustainable assumptions about contractual performance, and it did not carry out 
proper due diligence to determine the feasibility and viability of the investment in the pre-estab-
lishment phase.
The arbitration tribunal declared that the Tanzanian Government had violated 
the terms of its bilateral investment treaty with the UK.  However, the tribunal 
declined to award BGT the monetary damages requested. Even deciding about 
the costs of the arbitration, neither party was ordered to pay the costs incurred 
by the other, as both had been successful: Biwater Gauﬀ had proven that Tanza-
nia violated the BIT, and Tanzania, had been successful in resisting any claim for 
damages given the circumstances of the case.
5. Conclusion
In developing countries where structural adjustment loans have been contracted 
in the past and where global ﬁnancial pressure has pushed the governments to 
deregulate water and privatise the sector, foreign private investments have 
ﬂowered. A greater role and a greater responsibility should be placed on interna-
tional ﬁnancial institutions including human rights clauses in their ﬁnancing 
instruments.
Economic globalisation has shifted some of the regulation powers of 
Governments – with their complicity – to private economic actors. However, it 
should not amount to substituting the public interest of the citizens for the pri-
vate interest of a few individuals, including some corrupt governmental oﬃcials.
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The test of this decade for international investment law is when a decision 
needs to be made between ensuring the proﬁts of a private investor and protect-
ing human or environmental rights. The answer is certainly diﬃcult, since a bal-
ance has to be made by arbitrators outside the speciﬁc context of human rights 
courts or international bodies. The unity of international law and not its frag-
mentation can provide the basis to reconcile conﬂicting rules.
Transparency and good governance are the other two key values of our times. 
While conﬁdential business information must be protected (and this is the case 
in international commercial arbitration), when vital goods like water, are at 
stake, there should be information to the public about the terms of the privati-
zation and its impact on the society. This would lead to more responsible con-
tracting by companies and governments, and contribute to more consistent 
rulings by arbitrators, thereby reinforcing predictability and legitimacy of inter-
national law.
Last but not least, each government should consider the human rights impact 
in a range of broader policy areas, including when they sign trade agreements 
and investment treaties. What is needed, therefore, are government policies that 
induce greater corporate responsibility, and corporate strategies that reﬂect the 
now inescapable fact that their own long-term prospects are tightly coupled with 
the well-being of the society in which they operate.
